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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ELAINE CROFTS, 
Plaintiff and .Appellant, 
-vs.- No. 8440 
W. GLENN JOHNSON, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This is an appeal front a judgn1ent of the District 
Court of the Sixth Judicial District for Kane County 
entered September 26, 1955. The plaintiff and appellant 
claiming under an auditor's tax deed from Kane County 
filed suit against the defendant and respondent to quiet 
plaintiff's title to a home and lot in Kanab. The defen-
dant and respondent, the former owner of the property, 
answered and asked the court to declare the plaintiff's 
title to be held in trust for him. The court found the 
issues in favor of the defendant and respondent and 
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2 
entered judgment requiring the plaintiff and appellant 
to convey her title to the defendant and respondent upon 
reimbursement for the amount she paid for the tax deed 
with interest. 
No question was raised as to the validity and reg-
ularity of the assessment and tax sale proceedings either 
in the pleadings or at the trial. The sole issue both in 
the trial court and on appeal concerns the standing of 
the plaintiff and appellant to assert her tax title against 
the defendant and respondent. For the sake of brevity 
the plaintiff and appellant will hereinafter be referred 
to as the appellant and the defendant and respondent 
will be referred to as the respondent. 
The facts are almost entirely undisputed and the 
essential ones are here briefly set forth. On April 23, 
1946, the respondent (and his now deceased wife) mort-
gaged the premises in question to the St. George Building 
Society, St. George, Utah, for the sum of $2150.00. The 
property is described as follows : 
Beginning at the Southwest corner of Lot 3, 
Block 3, Plat "A" of the official survey of Kanab 
Townsite, and running thence East 10 rods; 
thence North 5 rods ; thence ''Test 10 rods ; thence 
South 5 rods to the place of beginning, contain-
ing 50 square rods be the same more or less, to-
gether with all improve1nents located thereon and 
all appurtenances thereunto appertaining. 
The respondent resided in J{anab on the premises 
until the latter part of 1949 at "~hieh time he left Kane 
County and rented the property to tenants. On October 
27, 1950, the St. George Building Society assigned the 
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respondent's note and Inortgage to Willia1n J. ~fackel­
prang, the father of the appellant. J\ilackelprang gave 
the Building Society his note and n1ortgage on different 
property as consideration for the assignment, and the 
appellant paid the Building Society the amount of the 
Mackelprang note over a period of three or four years 
(R. 37,80 and 81). The appellant paid the Building 
Society approximately $2300.00 plus interest (R. 80). 
The respondent was in default under his mortgage at 
the time of the assignment to ~iackelprang (R. 47). 
General taxes for the years 194 7, 1948, 1949 and 1950 were 
unpaid at the time of the assignment. Under the ter1ns 
of the note. and mortgage to the Building Society the 
mortgagee was not obligated to pay taxes on the mort-
gaged property (see exhibits A and B to complaints in 
Kane County civil files No. 23 and No .. 72). 
On November 1, 1950, Mackelprang filed a mortgage 
foreclosure complaint against the respondent in Kane 
County. The sheriff was unable to locate the · respon-
dent to serve sum1nons on hin1 (R. 70) and the action 
abated for failure to obtain service within one year 
after the filing of the complaint (Kane County Civil 
No. 23). The tenants moved off the property on Decem-
ber 13, 1950. Prior to December 13th 1fackelprang 
caused an eviction notice to be served on the tenants 
(R. 57). Prior to the time the tenants moved the appel-
lant telephoned Mrs. Young, one of the tenants, and 
told her that she (appellant) and her husband were buy-
ing the property and asked when the tenants "vere going 
to move (R. 56-7). The appellant and her husband took 
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possession of the premises December 24, 1950, and have 
been in continuous possession ever since (R. 34). When 
appellant took occupancy of the property she did so 
with the intent of and for the purpose of buying title 
to the property (R. 81). Mackelprang comn1enced his 
mortgage foreclosure action against the respondent in 
1950 for the purpose of foreclosing and securing clear 
title to the property (R. 67), and quite obviously for the 
further purpose of conveying his title to his daughter, 
the appellant. Appellant made improvements to make 
the property livable before moving in and continued to 
make improvements both before and after she bought 
the tax title in 1fay 1952 (R. 82). At the May Sale in 
1952 Mackelprang bid the property on behalf of appellant 
and appellant paid Kane County $262.45 for a tax deed 
(R. 64, 87). The property was sold by the county for 
delinquent taxes, penalties, interest and costs for the 
years 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950 and 1951 (R. 88), the May 
Sale being based on the expiration of the period of re-
demption for the delinquent 1947 taxes. The tax deed 
the appellant received in !:fay 1952 'vas defective in form 
(R. 71), and a corrected auditor's tax deed was issued 
to the appellant by Kane County on August 14, 1954 
(R. 87 Exhibit No.1). 
In October 1953 ~fackelprang conunenced a second 
mortgage foreclosure action against the respondent, 
which is still pending, although if the appellant's tax 
title is good the 1nortgage lien has been extinguished. 
Service of sum1nons on the respondent \vas obtained in 
this second foreclosure proceeding. Respondent had no 
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knowledge of Mackelprang's unsuccessful attempt to 
institute foreclosure proceedings in 1950 (R. 45), but 
he did hear that his tenants had been 1noved out (R. 45). 
From the time respondent's tenants 1noved until October, 
1.953, when he was served with sum1nons in the second 
foreclosure action, respondent thought that the Building 
Society had obtained title to the property and that he had 
no interest in it (R. 51-2). Fro1n Dece1nber 1950 until 
October 1953 respondent made no inquiry at the l{ane 
County courthouse, the St. George Building Society, the 
appellant or her father concerning the property (R. 
51-2), and neither paid nor attempted to pay taxes or 
mortgage payments. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE FROM WHICH THE TRIAL 
COURT COULD PROPERLY FIND THAT THE APPELLANT 
OWED A DUTY TO THE RESPONDENT WHICH WOULD 
DISQUALIFY HER FROM PURCHASING A TAX TITLE, 
AND THE TRIAL ·COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE 
APPELLANT A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTEE OF THE PROP-
ERTY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE RESPONDENT AND 
REQUIRING HER TO CONVEY HER TITLE TO THE RE-
SPONDENT. 
ARGUMENT 
1. APPELLANT TOOK ADVERSE AND HOSTILE POS-
SESSION OF THE PROPERTY SUBSEQUENT TO THE 
LEVY OF THE TAXES FOR WHICH 'THE PROPERTY WAS 
SOLD AND WAS ENTITLED TO PURCHASE A TAX TITLE. 
2. APPELLANT WAS NOT IN THE POSITION OF A 
MORTGAGEE AND NOT SUBJECT TO ANY INFIRMITIES 
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WHICH MIGHT ATTACH TO A MORTGAGEE REGARDING 
PURCHASE OF A TAX TITLE. 
3. EVEN ASSUMING APPELLANT WAS IN THE POSI-
TION OF A MORTGAGEE, SHE WAS ENTITLED TO PUR-
CHASE A T·AX TITLE UNDER THE FACTS OF 'THIS CASE. 
POINT 1 OF ARGUI\1ENT 
The general law is that any person not under a legal 
or moral duty to pay taxes on real estate may purchase 
a tax title and assert it against the world. 85 C.J.S. 
Taxation Sec. 809 (a), 51 Am. Jur. Taxation Sec. 1053. 
In this case the trial court made no finding or conclusion 
that the appellant was under any legal or moral duty 
to pay taxes on the property in dispute. 
The appellant took possession of the property in 
December 1950 at which tin1e the taxes for the years 
1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 were already past due and 
delinquent. Appellant was in no way obligated to pay 
these past due taxes. Paragraph 3 of the respondent's 
Answer (R. 8), the court's finding of fact No. 6 (R. 11) 
and the appellant's testimony that she told the tenants 
she was buying the property (R. 56-7) taken together 
with the respondent's testin1ony that he thought the 
Building Society had got hold of the property and he 
was out (R. 51-2) n1ake it very c.lear that appellant's pos-
session was hostile to any clailn of respondent and so 
understood by hhn. Under these circun1stanees there 
could be no duty upon the appellant to pay back taxes 
on the property. R.espondent had no reason whatever 
to expect appellant to pay his baek taxes and by his own 
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testimony had no such expectation. His total failure 
to make any inquiry concerning his property for three 
years after his tenants moved or to n1ake any effort to 
pay taxes or mortgage payrnents cornpels the conclusion 
that he simply abandoned the property rather than to 
face his tax and n1ortgage obligations. The appellant 
contends that her taking of possession under the circum-
stances of this case in no way disqualified her from pur-
chasing a tax title and that she stood in the same posi-
tion towards the respondent as a complete stranger to 
the property. It i~ the general rule that neither mere 
possession nor possession under which the possessor 
has or claims an interest will disqualify him from buying 
a tax title, provided he was under no obligation to pay 
the taxes for which the property was sold. 85 C.J.S. 
Taxation, Sec. 809 (a); 51 Am. Jur. Taxation, Sec. 1053. 
This rule applies to the appellant in this case and the 
lower court should have affirmed her tax title. 
POINT 2 OF ARGUMENT 
Assuming, but not conceding, that appellant's father, 
Mackelprang, as a mortgagee, was under a duty to pay 
taxes on the property and therefore disabled from buy-
ing a tax title, there is no reason for placing appellant 
in the same category. Mere relationship of child to 
parent who has a duty to pay taxes is insufficient to 
transfer that duty to the child. A Utah case and a recent 
Oklahorna case both approve the acquisition of a tax 
title by a child under these circumstances. Deseret Ir-
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rigation Company v. Bishop, 92 Utah 220, 67 Pacific 
2nd 210; Crane v. Taylor, 261 Pacific 2nd 587. 
As noted before in this brief, appellant's action in 
taking possession and making improvements was in com-
plete hostility to any claim or interest of the respondent 
in the property and so understood by him .. Appellant 
was not an assignee of the 1nortgage and took no part in 
any foreclosure proceedings. She could not have paid 
the taxes and then claimed a lien. The only link between 
appellant and Mackelprang, her father, is that she paid 
his note to the Building Society given as consideration 
for the assignment of the mortgage. The record is very 
clear that she did this with the intent of and for the 
purpose of buying title to the property and not to acquire 
any interest in the mortgage. The fact that ~fackelprang 
failed to foreclose the mortgage and secure title he could 
convey to her does not change her position from that 
of a purchaser to that of a mortgagee. The trial court 
made no finding or conclusion to the effect that ap-
pellant was in the position of a n1ortgagee and she should 
not be considered as such. 
POINT 3 OF ARGU~fENT 
Even assuming that appellant could properly be 
regarded as a mortgagee in this case, nevertheless under 
the facts disclosed by the record she 'vas not disqualified 
from purchasing a tax title and asserting it against the 
respondent. The 1nere existence of a Inortgagee-Inort-
gagor relationship does not disable the n1ort.gagee from 
purchasing a tax title to the n1ortgaged pren1ises. The 
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Utah statutes expressly give a 111ortgagee the right to 
take an assignment of the county's interest under a 
preliminary tax sale certificate, and, in the absence of a 
redemption, to acquire a tax deed from the county. Sec'"" 
tions 59-10-37 and 59-10-62, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Without benefit of this statute this court has upheld 
the right of a mortgagee to purchase a tax title and 
claiming under it to successfully interpose the statute of 
limitations against the mortgagor. Baker v. Goodn1an, 
57 Utah 349, 194 Pac 117. Oklahorna has likewise ap-
proved the purchase of a tax title by a mortgagee. Stith 
v. Gidney, 141 Pacific 2nd 1003. The Utah case Had-
lock v. Benjamin Drainage District, 89 Utah 94, 53 
Pacific 2nd 1156, seems at first glance to hold that a 
mortgagee cannot purchase a tax title, but in the writer's 
opinion that case can be clearly distinguished from the 
case at bar. In the Hadlock case a mortgagee who sub-
sequently took a quit claim deed fro1n the mortgagor 
in satisfaction of the mortgage and who also purchased 
a tax title from the county was not permitted to ass.ert 
his tax title against the tax lien of the drainage district. 
As stated in the opinion of the Chief Justice the deci-
sion was based partly on Laws of Utah 1921, chap. 140, 
p. 384, R. S. Utah, 1933, 80-10-68, which permitted a 
redemption after the period of redemption had expired 
but before sale. This provision of the law was eliminated 
by Laws of Utah, 1933, chap. 62. The majority opinion 
also laid emphasis on the fact that the tax title was being 
asserted against the drainage district, a governmental 
unit with power to levy taxes and create a lien on 
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real estate in the district. The majority opinion held that 
the mortgagee as 'vell as the mortgagor had a duty to pay 
the drainage district taxes and that neither could acquire 
a tax title and assert it against the lien of the drainage 
district. In this case the appellant, even considered 
as a mortgagee, had no duty of any kind to pay back 
taxes on behalf of the former owner who had abandoned 
the property. This case does not involve a governmental 
taxing unit. The question of a redemption under a now 
repealed statute is not an issue in this case. The dis-
senting opinion of Justice Wolfe in the Hadlock case 
points out that estoppel is the basis of the rule pro-
hibiting a person under a duty to pay taxes from 
purchasing a tax title. If there is no duty to pay taxes 
there can be no estoppel. Justice Folland in his dissent-
ing opinion points out that the Hadley decision fails to 
give any effect to the Utah statute expressly authorizing 
the purchase of a tax title by a mortgagee. Laws of 
Utah, 1919, chap. 122, no'v 59-10-37, lT.C.A., 1953, and 
59-10-62, U.C.A., 1953. In the opinion of the writer the 
dissenting opinions in the Hadley case are the law of 
this case both b~cause of their greater 1nerit and because 
the two cases can be distinguished. 
If appellant is considered as a 1nortgagee, the only 
possible basis for ilnpressing her "Tith a duty to pay 
taxes would have to stein fro1n her possession of the 
property. As stated above the respondent's n1ortgage 
to the Building Society did not obligate the n1ortgagee 
to pay the taxes. If appellant had taken possession under 
circu1nstances that would entitle respondent to look to 
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her for the pay1nent of taxes then she might be under 
an infirmity to purchase a tax title. No doubt this in.;. 
firmity would attach had the appellant been in posses-
sion with the consent of the respondent and in a capacity 
as mortgagee. On the contrary, however, the appellant 
took possession vvithout the consent of respondent, 
against his will and in total and complete repudiation of 
a mortgagee status. The respondent understood the 
hostile character of appellant's possession and at no 
time expected her to pay his taxes. Under these facts, 
which are not in dispute, how could the appellant be 
under any duty to pay the back taxes on the property¥ 
Where is there any basis for an estoppel against the 
appellant~ There is none, and whether considered as a 
mortgagee or not the appellant was entitled to purchase 
a tax title and assert it against the respondent under 
the facts of this case. 
SUM~IARY AND CONCLUSION 
In preparing this brief the writer has been con-
fronted with the awkward problem of assailing the 
validity of a judgment whose supposedly supporting 
findings and conclusions give not one hint as to the 
legal theory or reasoning behind it. There is no sugges-
tion as to what facts, if any, might give rise to a duty 
to pay taxes on the part of the appellant or might give 
rise to a fiduciary relationship between appellant and 
respondent. The lovver court n1erely stated the bald and 
ultimate conclusion that the appellant held her tax title 
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In trust for the respondent without bothering to give 
any reason whatever as to why this was so. 
Having no idea of the basis, if any, for the lower 
court's decision the writer has attempted to explore the 
possibilities even remotely suggested by the record and 
to show that the respondent failed to prove that there is 
any reason for impressing the appellant's tax title with a 
constructive trust for the benefit of the respondent. The 
judgment of the lower court should be set aside and 
judgment entered quieting the appellant's title against 
~he respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID F. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
623 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
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